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11.  Introduction
Public health studies use a variety of scales and supporting procedures to measure health
outcomes for an individual and to measure the effects of a public health policy for a population
of individuals. In order to compare policy options, an analyst must decide how to aggregate the
scale amounts for the individuals into a scale amount for the population. For example, should she
use the sum or should she use a weighted sum, and should she use the scale amounts themselves
or should she first transform the scale amounts to a different scale?
Moreover, the analyst may need to use the individual and population health scales to measure
changes in health for an individual or for a population. For example, what procedures can she use
to report a predicted improvement in the distribution of health over a population as an equivalent
improvement that is hypothetical but easier to grasp?
This paper presents models and procedures that address these questions. The models involve
a type of preferences usually referred to as preference intensity, cardinal preference, preference
difference, or strength-of-preference. We will call such preferences an intensity relation. Unlike
a preference relation that compares probability distributions of outcomes or that compares
multiattribute outcomes, an intensity relation compares changes in outcomes. The next section
argues that changes in outcomes can be compared in a public policy context and thus intensity
relations have an operational meaning in such a context.
If an intensity relation satisfies certain conditions, it is represented by a function such that
one change is preferred to another when the difference in function values for the first change is
greater. Like an intensity relation, such a function has various names, e.g., a difference function,
a measurable value function, and a cardinal utility function. We will call such a function either a
difference function to emphasize that it has the above property or a cardinal scale to emphasize
that (at least under certain conditions) it is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
Here, the outcomes are health outcomes. The general model contains: (i) for each member of
a population, an intensity relation that compares changes in the person’s health outcomes, and
(ii) for the population, an intensity relation that compares changes in the health outcomes over
the population. Each individual and population intensity relation is represented by a difference
function. The model defines a Pareto condition that connects the individual and population
2intensity relations, and it establishes that the intensity relations satisfy the condition if and only if
a difference function for health over the population is a weighted sum of difference functions for
the health outcomes of the population members. Thus, cardinal scale amounts for the individuals
are aggregated by means of interpersonal weights into a cardinal scale amount for the population.
This model is an adaptation to the context of public health of social welfare models in Dyer
and Sarin (1979) and Harvey (1999) that discuss preferences between changes in outcomes.
These social welfare models are parallel to the well-known model due to Harsanyi (1955) that
discusses preferences between probability distributions of outcomes.
The first part of this paper presents the health aggregation model outlined above. It also
discusses when the interpersonal weights can or cannot be chosen as equal.
The second part presents cardinal models concerning health outcomes for an individual. The
health outcomes are of two types: health states, and health-duration pairs. By a health state, we
mean the health of a person, measured along one or more dimensions. Public health studies can
make different assumptions as to the state’s duration and what health states occur afterward. And
by a health-duration pair, we mean a health state and as additional information the duration of
the health state. Again, public health studies can make different assumptions as to what occurs
afterward. Several options are death, optimal health, or a return to normal health.
This paper does not discuss models in which a health outcome contains more than one health
state: e.g., a health outcome is a sequence of annual health states, a sequence of health-duration
pairs, or a continuous stream of health states. For such health outcomes, Harvey and Østerdal
(2006) present ordinal models that can serve as a basis for a cardinal health aggregation model.
In the third part of the paper, we assume that an analyst has used the models and procedures
in the first two parts to obtain a difference function that compares changes in the distribution of
health over a population. We discuss procedures by which the analyst can use such a function to
evaluate a specified change in population health by calculating an indifferent change that can be
simply stated. Hence, the models provide a basis and a method for evaluating changes in public
health. For this reason, we will refer to the general model as a public health evaluation model.
Most of the results in this paper, as well as in Harvey (1999), are based on work by the
Danish mathematician, J.L.W.V. Jensen (1905, 1906). Proofs of results are in the Appendix.
32.  Is an Intensity Relation Meaningful?
Pareto (1896) and Fisher (1918) pointed out long ago that the term ‘utility’ had two different
meanings: (i) an older, hedonic meaning in utilitarianism and material welfare theory as the
degree of pleasure and pain (or welfare, wellbeing, etc.) that a person experiences as part of a
specified consequence, and (ii) a newer, choice-oriented meaning in consumer theory as the
degree to which a consequence satisfies a person’s preferences. Pareto gave an illustration in
which the two meanings differ: a child may experience better health by taking medicine even
though the child much prefers not to take the medicine.
An insufficient recognition of the distinction made by Pareto and Fisher led to a schism
between welfare economists (using hedonic utility) and ordinalist economists (using choice-
oriented utility); see, e.g., Cooter and Rappoport (1984). Later, a similar misunderstanding was
caused by an insufficient recognition that while utility had a hedonic meaning in the expected-
utility theory of Bernoulli (1738) it had a choice-oriented meaning in the expected-utility theory
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in
the hedonic meaning of utility; see, e.g., Broome (1991ab, 2004), Kahneman et al. (1997), and
Kahneman (2000).
In this paper, we take the position that in a public health study one can assign either a
hedonic meaning or a choice-oriented meaning to comparisons of changes in health.
Explicitly or implicitly, a public health study includes value judgments concerning individual
and population health. Following what may be an abuse of language, we will refer to any such
judgments as social values. Judgments that compare changes in a person’s health can be made by
the person himself, or they can be made by someone else (an expert, an agency, or an idealized
person). Usually, the social values will agree with the preferences of the affected individuals.
If an intensity relation defined on changes in an individual’s health is regarded as comparing
differences in a hedonic scale of individual wellbeing, then the comparisons are possible in
principle, no matter how difficult it may be to construct the scale. And if an intensity relation
defined on changes in health over a population is regarded as comparing differences in a hedonic
scale of population wellbeing, then comparisons are also possible.
4But if an intensity relation defined on changes in the health of an individual or a population is
regarded as the preferences of some entity, then an important question is whether the intensity
relation is meaningful. Before presenting models that contain intensity relations, we need to
address this question.
A classic technique of economic analysis is to specify a set of alternatives to be compared so
that it includes not only possible alternatives but also alternatives that are similar but not possible.
Here, we argue that in the context of public health, if this economic technique is reasonable, then
comparisons of changes in a person’s health and comparisons of changes in health distributions
are meaningful—even though health changes have a different structure than health outcomes.
First, consider changes in health for an individual. When he faces a decision that affects only
himself, his initial position is the same for any alternative, and thus his comparisons of options
are comparisons of final outcomes, what are known as ordinal preferences. Comparisons of
changes having different initial positions are not needed and in this sense are not meaningful.
But when a society faces a decision that affects many individuals, the initial positions of the
individuals will most likely be different; e.g., the initial positions may be the different health
outcomes of the individuals for a policy of non-intervention. The preferences of the society will
include comparisons of changes in health from these different initial positions. Thus, preferences
between changes in an individual’s health have the same operational meaning for a society that
preferences between final outcomes have for an individual decision maker.
Second, consider changes in health over a population. Since the policy options for the society
have the same initial distribution of health, they can be described by their final distributions of
health. In this situation, do preferences between changes in health have an operational meaning?
We think so, for the following reason. The population can be divided into subpopulations, e.g.,
age groups, some of which have better distributions of health than others, and thus the society
must compare changes for groups whose initial distributions of health are different. By the above
argument, comparisons of changes for such a group are meaningful. If changes in distributions of
health over the entire population are regarded as similar to changes in distributions of health over
a subpopulation, then it follows that comparisons of changes in health for the entire population
also are meaningful.
53.  A Public Health Evaluation Model
In this section, we construct a public health evaluation model that is based on the social
welfare model in Harvey (1999). Suppose that as part of a public health study one has specified a
population of potentially affected individuals and a type of health outcomes for the individuals.
The individuals will be indexed by i N= …1, , ; a health outcome for an i-th individual will be
denoted by hi ; and the set of health outcomes will be denoted by H i . The health outcomes can
be of any type: e.g., health states, health-duration pairs, or a type not discussed in this paper.
A distribution of health outcomes over the population will be called a health distribution and
will be denoted by h = …( , , )h hN1 . Thus, we distinguish between a health outcome for an
individual and a health distribution for a population. We assume that the set of health distribu-
tions is the product set H HN1 ×…× .
A change from a health outcome hi  to a health outcome ′hi  for an i-th individual will be
denoted by hi hi→ ′ , and a change from a health distribution h  to a health distribution h′  for the
population will be denoted by h h→ ′ . An intensity relation will compare changes in health
outcomes, or it will compare changes in health distributions. We will refer to the comparisons as
preferences even though they may equally well have a hedonic meaning.
As common notation for the individual and population cases, suppose that   denotes an
intensity relation for changes h h→ ′  in a set H  and that w h( )  denotes a difference function for
 , that is: h h h h→ ′ → ′ ˆ ˆ  if and only if w h w h w h w h( ) ( ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ)′ − ≥ ′ − . Here, h h h h→ ′ → ′ ˆ ˆ
means that the change h h→ ′  is preferred to or indifferent to the change ˆ ˆh h→ ′ .
The social welfare model assumes (as stated for a health context) that for each i-th individual
there is an intensity relation that compares changes in health distributions over the population.
The intensity relation may reflect social values that focus on the i-th individual or it may reflect
the preferences or the hedonic experiences of the i-th individual.
Here, we assume that the intensity relation for an i-th individual depends only on the i-th
components hi  in the health distributions. Thus, the intensity relation corresponds to another
intensity relation, to be denoted by  i , that is defined on the set H i  and that compares changes
in health outcomes for the i-th individual. We will call  an individual intensity relation.
We expect that in most applications, the sets H i  of health outcomes will be chosen as a
common set and the intensity relations  i  will be chosen as a common intensity relation. These
6assumptions permit the set of possible outcomes be a subset, even a small subset, of the common
set and to differ from person to person; for example, younger people and older people may have
different sets of possible outcomes.
The social welfare model also assumes that there is an intensity relation that compares
changes in health distributions and that reflects social values regarding public health. We will
denote such a relation by P  and call it a population intensity relation.
A difference function for an individual intensity relation  i  will be called an individual
difference function and will be denoted by w hi i( ) . And a difference function for a population
i ntensi ty relat i on P  wil l be cal led a popul at ion di ff er ence f unct i on and wi ll be denot ed by W ( )h . 
Various models have been constructed in which conditions on an intensity relation   imply
the existence of a difference function, but except for the model of Scott (1964) in which H  is a
finite set there is no model in which the conditions are equivalent to the existence of a difference
function. The approach in the other models has been to add a non-necessary condition in order to
obtain existence. And except for the model of Scott, the conditions that imply the existence of a
difference function also imply that it is cardinally unique, that is:  If w h( )  and ˆ ( )w h  are two
difference functions, then there exist constants  a > 0  and b  such that ˆ ( ) ( )w h a w h b= +  for h  in
H . Here, we will use the following non-necessary condition.
Properness condition.  The intensity relation   defined on a set H  is proper in the sense that it
has a difference function w h( )  such that the range of w h( )  is a non-point interval.
As shown in the Appendix, the properness condition implies that w h( )  is cardinally unique.
The reason for requiring a non-point range is to exclude the uninteresting case in which any
changes h h→ ′  in H  are indifferent.
There are models in which conditions on a pair ( , )H   imply that   is proper; see, e.g., Alt
(1936), Debreu (1960), and Pfanzagl (1968). The social welfare model in Harvey (1999) assumes
that each relation  i  and P  satisfies one of these sets of conditions. The model in this section
weakens this requirement by assuming that each relation and P  is proper. This change allows
the use of any future conditions that imply that  i  and P  are proper. In particular, we expect
to present in later research a set of conditions that permit certain health scales in the description
7of a health state to be categorical variables rather than continuous variables and that permit types
of health outcomes other than health states and health-duration pairs.
Next, we consider how a population intensity relation P  might be connected to individual
intensity relations  i . The condition below provides what seems a natural connection. We will
call it a Pareto condition because of its similarity to Pareto conditions on preferences between
probability distributions and on preferences between multivariable outcomes.
Pareto condition.  For any changes h h→ ′  and ˆ ˆh h→ ′  in health distributions, if there is an i-th
individual such that h hj j→ ′  is indifferent to ˆ ˆh hj j→ ′  for each j i≠ , then preferences between
hi hi→ ′  and ˆ ˆhi hi→ ′  according to the individual intensity relation  i  imply preferences
between h h→ ′  and  according to the population intensity relation P .
In other words, when society does not need to make tradeoffs between changes in the health
of different persons, then preferences between changes in public health agree with preferences
between changes in health for the one person who matters. In this sense, the Pareto condition is a
requirement of consumer sovereignty.
The result below is based on a result in Harvey (1999). Both results show that if individual
and population intensity relations are connected in a simple fashion, then individual and popula-
tion difference functions are connected in a simple fashion. Because of evaluation procedures
discussed in the final section, we will refer to the result as a public health evaluation model.
Theorem 1.  A set of proper intensity relations  i , i N= …1, , , and P  satisfy the Pareto
condition if and only if for any individual difference functions w hi i( )  there exist weights ai > 0
such that the function:
W a w h a w hN N N( ) ( ) ( )h = +…+1 1 1 (1)
is a population difference function. The weights ai  in (1) are unique up to a positive multiple.
This model provides a foundation for evaluating changes in public health by a scale that is
the sum or a weighted sum of scales that measure preferences regarding changes in health for
individuals. Hence, it provides a foundation for the utilitarian principle that cardinal utility for a
society is the sum (or a weighted sum) of cardinal utilities for the members of the society.
84.  Interpersonal Weights
This section discusses two simplifications/restrictions in the public health evaluation model.
The first is that the individual intensity relations  i  are equal (and thus the sets Hi  are equal).
As remarked above, we think this simplification will be made in most applications of the model.
It does not imply that the individuals have equal sets of possible health outcomes.
With this simplification, it is natural to choose individual difference functions w hi i( )  that
are equal. Such a model will be called an equal preferences model. As notation that is concise
(but that does overlap with our general notation for both the individual and population cases),
suppose that: HI  denotes the common set of health outcomes, either hi  or h  denotes a health
outcome, I  denotes the common individual intensity relation, and w h( )  denotes an individual
difference function. Theorem 1 states that for any individual difference function w h( )  there
exists a population difference function of the form, W a w h a w hN N( ) ( ) ( )h = +…+1 1 , where
the weights 
 
ai > 0 , i N= …1, , , are unique up to a positive multiple.
In an equal preferences model, a ratio a ai j/  of weights in a population difference function,
W a w h a w hN N( ) ( ) ( )h = +…+1 1 , is the same as the ratio ˆ / ˆa ai j  of the corresponding weights
in any other population difference function, ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( )W a w h a w hN Nh = +…+1 1 . This property of
invariance is important for assessing the weights in terms of interpersonal tradeoffs, and for this
reason, we will refer to the weights in an equal preferences model as interpersonal weights. In a
general health evaluation model, the weights are not invariant in this sense.
The second simplification is to assume that the interpersonal weights in an equal preferences
model are equal. By the invariance property, if some weights ai  are equal, then any weights aˆi
are equal. An equal preferences model with equal interpersonal weights will be called an equal
weights model. In such a model, any positive number can be chosen as a common interpersonal
weight. In particular, we can choose 
 
ai = 1  or a Ni = 1 / . Thus, we have the following result.
Corollary 1.  In an equal weights model, for any individual difference function w h( )  each of the
following functions is a population difference function:
W w h w hN( ) ( ) ( )h = +…+1 ,      W N w h w hN( ) / ( ) ( )( )h = +…+1 1 (2)
9Next, we state conditions on a population intensity relation in an equal preferences model,
each of which is satisfied if and only if the interpersonal weights are equal.
As what may be an awkward notation, suppose that for two health outcomes h , ′h ,  h
denotes the health distribution in which h hi =  for i N= …1, , , and ( ; )h h hi = ′  denotes the
health distribution in which h hi = ′  and h hj =  for j i≠ . Suppose, moreover, that for three
health outcomes h , ′h , ′′h ,  ( , ; )h h h h hi j= ′ = ′′  denotes the health distribution in which
h hi = ′ , h hj = ′′ , and h hk =  for k i j≠ , .
(a)  For any health outcomes h , ′h  and for any two individuals i j, , society is indifferent
between the change h→ = ′( ; )h h hi  in population health and the change h→ = ′( ; )h h hj  in
population health. (For instance, if h h→ ′  is an improvement in a person’s health, then society
is indifferent as to which person obtains the improvement.)
In terms of our general notation for both the individual and population cases, an intensity
relation   defined on a set H  induces a so-called ordinal relation, to be denoted by o , that
compares the elements h  in H . Often, the ordinal relation is defined by:  h ho ′  if and only if
h h h h→ ′ → . A difference function for the intensity relation   (i.e., a cardinal scale) also
represents the ordinal relation o , but a function that represents the ordinal relation o  (i.e., an
ordinal scale) may or may not represent the intensity relation  .
When an intensity relation   has a difference function, then for a fixed initial element h :
h h h h→ ′ → ′′  if and only if ′ ′′h ho  (as one can check). Thus, preferences between changes
with the same initial element are described by the ordinal relation.
The following condition is based on the ordinal relations induced by I  and P .
(b)  For any health outcomes h , ′h , ′′h  and for any two individuals  i j, , society is indifferent
between the health distributions ( , ; )h h h h hi j= ′ = ′′  and ( , ; )h h h h hi j= ′ = ′′ .
Theorem 2.  In an equal preferences model, conditions (a) and (b) are equivalent to one another
and to the condition that the interpersonal weights are equal.
When a population is divided into subpopulations (e.g., grouped according to age), each of
the conditions (a), (b) can be restricted to the subpopulations.
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Corollary 2.  In an equal preferences model, suppose that the population is divided into subpop-
ulations. Then, conditions (a) and (b) when weakened to hold within each subpopulation are
equivalent to one another and to the condition that the interpersonal weights within each
subpopulation are equal.
There are circumstances in which the relation P  satisfies conditions (a), (b) only when they
are restricted to subpopulations and yet one can justifiably assign equal weights for the entire
population. This is the case if the range of possible health distributions is limited such that the
health outcomes in each health distribution have the same average amount is each subpopulation.
Theorem 3.  Suppose that w h( )  is an individual difference function in an equal preferences
model. Suppose also that the population is divided into subpopulations P Pk1, ,…  of sizes
n nk1, ,…  and that the population intensity relation P  satisfies conditions (a), (b) for each of
the subpopulations. Then, for any health distribution h = …( , , )h hN1  that has the same average
amount of the cardinal scale w h( )  in each subpopulation, that is,
1 1
1 1n
w hii n
w hiiP P
k k
( ) ( )∈ = … = ∈∑ ∑ , (3)
the evaluation of h  in (1) with the weights a ak1 1+…+ =  equals its evaluation in (2) with the
equal weights a Ni = 1 / , i N= …1, , . Both evaluations are the common average in (3).
Moreover, the equalities (3) hold for any cardinal scale w h( )  or for no cardinal scale w h( ) .
When are unequal interpersonal weights needed?
What differences among the members of a population should imply unequal importance for
the same health outcomes for different individuals?  One possibility is differences in age. Here,
we discuss several reasons why different weights might be assigned to people of different ages.
First, age can be related to the social importance of individuals. Murray (1994) and Murray
and Acharya (1997) argue that since working-aged adults make greater economic contributions
than do children or seniors their health has greater social importance. The authors assign unequal
weights to persons of different ages as part of a “Disability Adjusted Life Years” (DALY) scale
for health time-streams. Often, in a DALY scale the weight assigned to a person aged 25 is about
twice the weight assigned to someone aged 6 or 67. See Anand and Hanson (1997) for a critical
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review. In our opinion, it is not justified to infer unequal social importance from unequal
economic roles. Moreover, U.S. health policies (e.g., health programs for children and Medicare)
implicitly assign greater weights to children and to seniors than to working-aged adults.
Second, age can be related to concerns for equality. Greater age tends to imply greater
lifetime health and longevity. Williams (1997) argues for assigning weights that favor equality in
people’s lifetime quality-adjusted life years. The weights resulting from this ‘fair-innings
argument’ will be greater for younger people than for older people.
Greater age also tends to imply lesser future health and longevity. One can argue for assigning
weights that favor equality in people’s future quality-adjusted life years. The weights resulting
from this future-equality argument will be greater for older people than for younger people.
Another criterion—one in the spirit of utilitarianism—is to assign weights that favor the sum
of improvements in health and longevity. To examine this criterion, first assume that health
outcomes are defined as health states—with the duration of a health state and any ensuing states
unknown. A change in health states (e.g., from fatality to a state of no health problem) is likely to
produce a greater improvement in a person’s health and longevity for a younger person than for
an older person. So when health outcomes are defined as health states the resulting weights may
be greater for younger people. But when health outcomes are defined as health-duration pairs, a
change in health outcomes entails the same improvement in health and longevity for an older
person as for a younger person. So for health-duration pairs, knowing the ages of the population
members does not provide a reason for assigning unequal weights.
Typically, the comparison of policy options in an equal weights model with health states will
differ from a comparison of the same options in an equal weights model with health-duration
pairs or health outcome-streams. In particular, fatalities will count the same regardless of age in
an equal weights model with health states whereas a fatality for an older person will count less
t han a fat al i ty f or a younger person in an equal weight s m odel wi th heal t h- durat ion pai rs or heal th
outcome-streams. In such a context, one cannot assign equal weights both in a model with health
states and in the corresponding model with health-duration pairs or health outcome-streams.
Similar observations have been made for expected-utility models; see, e.g., Bordley (1994) and
Hammitt (2002).
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5.  Health States
This section discusses the case in which a health outcome is a state of a person’s health. For
example, the health outcome may be a morbidity or an injury or it may be the condition of a
person’s health in general. A health outcome defined in this manner will be called a health state.
In the next section, a health state is part of a health outcome rather than the health outcome
itself. In order to have a consistent notation, we will denote a health state by si  and the set of
health states by Si . Hence, in this section hi  becomes si  and Hi  becomes Si .
An important part of a model of health states is a scale that measures ordinal comparisons of
health. The scale is often called ‘health-related quality of life’ or ‘quality-of-life’ (see, e.g., Gold
et al., 1996, Dolan et al., 1996, and Dolan, 2000). We will call such a scale a quality scale, and
we will denote it by q si( ) .
The first part of this section discusses the possible linkage between a predetermined quality
scale q si( )  and an individual intensity relation  i . In particular, we discuss when q si( )  is an
individual difference function. The second part of this section broadens the discussion to include
a population intensity relation P . In particular, we discuss how the presence of P  makes
possible certain procedures for assessing an individual difference function from a quality scale.
Quality scales have been developed both for morbidity and trauma. Most of the established
scales are multiattribute expected-utility functions. As examples of this type of scale there are:
the Functional Capacity Index, the Quality of Wellbeing scale (Kaplan and Anderson, 1996), the
Health Utilities Indices (Torrance et al., 1982, 1995, 1996; Feeney et al., 1996; and Furlong et
al., 1998), the Health and Activities Limitation Index (HALex), the SF-36 metric for health
status measurement, and the EuroQoL quality of life scales (Kind, 1996; Dolan, 1997; and
Richardson et al., 2001).
Procedures to assess a quality scale have been developed, either as part of a health study or as
a separate undertaking. Examples of these assessment procedures (commonly called scales)
include: time tradeoff scales, standard gamble scales, person tradeoff scales, and rating scales;
see, e.g., Torrance (1976, 1986) and Dolan et al. (1996).
Here, we assume that a quality scale q si( )  has been chosen or assessed for the purpose of
measuring the health of each individual in a population. This assumption implies that the sets Si
13
of health states are a common set, which we will denote by S . The assumption does not imply
any connection between q si( )  and the individual intensity relations  i . In order to examine
when the scale q si( )  is connected to a relation  i , we will use the following condition.
Properness condition.  The range of the quality scale q si( )  is a non-point interval.
We expect that in most if not all applications, the health states will be described by one or
more so-called dimensions, each of which is measured by a scale. Then, a health state si  is a
vector of scale amounts, and the set S  of health states is the product set of the ranges of the
scales. If every scale is categorical, i.e., it has a finite set of values, then the set is finite, and thus
the quality scale q si( )  cannot be proper. On the other hand, if at least one of the scales is
continuous, i.e., it has an interval set of values, then the quality scale may or may not be proper.
We intend to discuss in a later paper conditions which imply that a quality scale must be proper.
Conditions (c) and (d) below are weaker than the definitions of ordinal and cardinal scales,
and hence easier to verify. Nevertheless, in the context of proper intensity relations and quality
scales they suffice to imply that q si( )  is an individual difference function.
(c)  For any health states, si  and ′si , q s q si i( ) ( )> ′  if and only if si  is preferred to ′si  according
to the ordinal preferences induced by the individual intensity relation  i .
(d)  For any changes, s si i→ ′  and ˆ ˆs si i→ ′ ,  if q s q s q s q si i i i( ) ( ) ( ˆ ˆ )′ ′ ) − (− = > 0 , then the
changes are indifferent according to the individual intensity relation  i .
Theorem 4.  Suppose that q si( )  is a proper quality scale and that  i  is a proper individual
intensity relation. Then:
(i)  q si( )  and  i  satisfy condition (c) if and only if q si( )  is an ordinal scale for  i  and any
individual difference function has the form w s f q si i( ) ( ( ) )=  where f q( )  is a strictly increasing
and continuous function.
(ii)  q si( )  and  i  satisfy conditions (c) and (d) if and only if q si( )  is an individual difference
function for  i .
When q si( )  and  i  satisfy conditions (c) and (d), the task of determining an individual
difference function is completed. And when they satisfy the ordinal condition (c) but not the
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cardinal condition (d), the task is reduced to that of assessing a function f q( )  having the
properties in (i). Such a function will be called a conversion function since it converts the
‘ordinal’ units of the quality scale into the ‘cardinal’ units of an individual difference function.
The combination of conditions (c) and (d) for every i N= …1, ,  implies that the individual
intensity relations  i  are equal. However, condition (c) for every i N= …1, ,  does not have this
implication since the conversion functions f q( )  can vary from one individual to another.
Next, we describe two types of procedures for assessing an individual difference function.
Throughout this paper, we define the term ‘assessment’ to include any means of obtaining social
values: e.g., elicitation from a decision maker, stated assumptions, or the use of survey results.
Equal-differences procedures
The following procedures for assessing an individual difference function will be called equal-
differences procedures. First, we assume that a proper quality scale q si( )  that satisfies condition
(c) has been determined, and second we omit this assumption.
As one equal-differences procedure, assess a sequence, s s n( ) ( ), ,0 … , of health states with
increasing scale amounts q si( )  such that s s
k k( ) ( )− →1  is indifferent to s sk k( ) ( )→ +1  for each
k n= … −1 1, , . A conversion function can be defined for these health states by f q s kk( ( )) ,( ) =
k n= …0, , ,  and then can be extended to other health states by approximate interpolation.
As another equal-differences procedure, select a pair of extreme health states s( ),0  s( )1  with
q s q s( ) ( )( ) ( )1 0> . For example, s( )0  and s( )1  might be death and no injury. Assess a health state
s( / )1 2  such that s s( ) ( / )0 1 2→  and s s( / ) ( )1 2 1→  are indifferent. Then, f q s f q s( ( )) ( ( ))( / ) ( )1 2 0− =
f q s f q s( ( )) ( ( ))( ) ( / )1 1 2− , and thus f q s( ( ))( / )1 2 = 1 2 0 1 2 1/ ( ( )) / ( ( ))( ) ( )f q s f q s+ . In a similar
manner, assess a health state s( / )1 4  between s( )0  and s( / )1 2  and a health state s( / )3 4  between
s( / )1 2  and s( ).1  A conversion function can be defined for these health states by f q s kk( ( ))( ) =
for k = …0 1 4, / ,  and then can be extended to other health states by approximate interpolation.
The above procedures can also be used to assess an individual difference function w si( )
when no quality scale is available. In the first procedure, define w s kk( )( ) =  for k n= …0, , ,
and in the second procedure, define w s kk( )( ) =  for k = …0 1 4, / , .
In this situation, there are multiple health dimensions (since otherwise the single dimension
provides a quality scale), and thus the procedure must be supplemented with other assessments.
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For each health state s k( ) , one could for example use tradeoffs procedures to assess a number of
health states that are indifferent to s k( ) .
At this point, we broaden the discussion to include a population intensity relation P . Again,
we first assume that a quality scale q si( )  that satisfies condition (c) has been determined. Then,
there exists a conversion function f q( )  as described in Theorem 4 such that w s f q si i( ) ( ( ) )=  is
an individual difference function and W s sN( , , )1 … = f q s f q sN( ( ) ) ( ( ))1 +…+  is a population
difference function.
Person-tradeoffs procedures
The following procedures for assessing an individual difference function will be called
person-tradeoffs procedures. Similar procedures for other types of scales have been proposed by
several authors (see, e.g., Richardson 1994; Nord, 1995; and Green 2001). Some authors have
observed that person-tradeoffs procedures are intuitively appealing while others have observed
that they lack a foundation, that is, they lack stated conditions on preferences that justify the
procedures. The public health evaluation model provides such a foundation.
Suppose that we have an equal weights model with a proper quality scale q si( ) , and thus the
task is to assess a conversion function. Select two extreme health states s( ),0  s( )1  such that
q s q s( ) ( )( ) ( )1 0> . Since by Theorem A1 an individual difference function is cardinally unique,
there is a unique conversion function f q( )  such that f q s( ( ) )( )0 0=  and f q s( ( ) )( )1 1= . Choose
a list consisting of s( ),0  s( )1  and some intermediate health states, and for each health state si  in
the list assess a number n si( )  such that society is indifferent between an improvement from s
( )0
to si  for the entire population and an improvement from s
( )0  to s( )1  for n si( )  members of the
population. Then, N f q s n si i× = ×( ( )) ( ) 1, and thus f q s n s Ni i( ( )) ( ) /= . Hence, the conversion
function can be defined by f q s n s Ni i( ( )) ( ) /=  for the health states si  in the list, and then it can
be extended to other health states by approximate interpolation.
The above procedure can also be used to assess an individual difference function w si( )  if no
quality scale is available. In this case, define w s n s Ni i( ) ( ) /=  for the health states si  in the list.
The health states in a person-tradeoffs procedure are selected (e.g., for simplicity) whereas
those in an equal-differences procedure are assessed (and thus represent social values). Hence,
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person-tradeoffs procedures but not equal-differences procedures can be used in those situations
in which only a sparse set of health states can be visualized and thus are available to assess.
A quality scale q si( )  is an individual difference function if and only if it satisfies condition
( d) . One can veri fy (d) dir ectl y, or one can use an equal di ff er ences or per son-t radeoff s procedur e
to determine whether the conversion function is linear. Thus, the public health evaluation model
has the unusual feature that either intrapersonal equal-differences procedures or interpersonal
person-tradeoffs procedures (or a combined procedure) can be used to assess its components.
Social Attitudes toward Inequality
Suppose that s = …( , , )s sN1  denotes a health distribution in which the health outcomes are
health states. A change  s s→ ′  from an initial health distribution s  to a final health distribution
 ′s  consists of changes s si i→ ′  from initial health states si  to final health states ′si . What is
society’s attitude (as modeled in a public health evaluation model) toward inequality in the final
health states?  Here, we discuss two interpretations of this question.
(1)  Society is neutral as to whether a change from one health distribution to another increases
or decreases the degree of inequality in the final health states. To illustrate, suppose that s s s, ,′ ′′
are three health states such that  s  is worst, ′′s  is best, and the changes, s s→ ′  and ′ → ′′s s , are
indifferent according to the individual intensity relation. For example, the health states s s s, ,′ ′′
might be death, severe injury, and no injury. Consider three health distributions s s s, ,′ ′′  in
which an i-th individual has the health states s s s, ,′ ′′  respectively, and everyone else has the
intermediate health state ′s .  The Pareto condition implies that the changes,  s s→ ′  and  ′ → ′′s s ,
are indifferent according to the population intensity relation even though the change  s s→ ′
entails a decrease in inequality whereas the change  ′ → ′′s s  entails an increase in inequality.
(2)  As we show below, in an equal weight model society may or may not be neutral as to
whether a health distribution s = …( , , )s sN1  has equal quality scale amounts q si( ) . For a more
extensive discussion of this issue of social preferences in the context of ordinal welfare functions
rather than in the present context of cardinal welfare functions, see Harvey (1985).
Suppose that s = …( , , )s s  is a health distribution with the same health state s  for each
individual and that s = …( , , )s sN1  is a health distribution with unequal quality scale amounts
for at least two individuals.
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(i) Social preferences will be called inequality neutral provided that for any health distributions
s , s  as described, q s q s q sN N( ) / ( ) ( )( )= +…+1 1  implies that s  is indifferent to s .
(ii) Social preferences will be called inequality averse provided that for any health distributions
s , s  as described, q s q s q sN N( ) / ( ) ( )( )= +…+1 1  implies that s  is preferred to s .
Theorem 5.  For an equal weights model with a quality scale q si( )  that satisfies condition (c):
(i)  Social preferences are inequality neutral if and only if the quality scale q si( )  is an
individual difference function.
(ii)  Social preferences are inequality averse if and only if any conversion function f q( )  is
strictly concave. (Then, q si( )  is not an individual difference function.)
6.  Health-Duration Pairs
A health outcome can be defined to include information on the timing of one or more states
of health. This section discusses health outcomes that are defined as a constant health state and
its duration. A health outcome defined in this manner will be called a health-duration pair. The
duration of a health state can be defined as the time from a specified event, e.g., an accident or
the onset of a disease, in which case different individuals will have different initial times, or it
can be defined as the time from a common initial time, e.g., a specified present time.
A health state will again be denoted by si , and its duration in years will be denoted by t i .
Thus, a health-duration pair for an i-th individual will be denoted by h s ti i i= ( , ) .
Most models of health-duration pairs are expected-utility models; see, e.g., Bleichrodt et al.
(1997) for a discussion of the advantages of such models. The simplest utility functions are of
the form u s t t v si i i i( , ) ( )=  where the linear factor t i  represents risk neutrality toward duration.
In these models, a health-duration pair (or a probability distribution of such pairs) is measured by
a utility amount that represents an equivalent time in a state of optimal health; the amount is
called ‘quality-adjusted life years’ (QALYs) or ‘healthy-years equivalents’ (HYEs).
We regard the various QALY models in Pliskin, Shepard, and Weinstein (1980) as the basic
expected-utility models for health-duration pairs. Alternative conditions on preferences are
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presented in Bleichrodt et al. (1997) and Miyamoto et al. (1998) for expected-utility models and
in Doctor and Miyamoto (2003) and Østerdal (2005) for deterministic models. QALY models for
health-duration pairs are also presented or discussed in Loomes and McKenzie (1989),
Johannesson et al. (1994), Gold et al. (1996), and Dolan (2000).
A very different modeling approach is presented in Mehrez and Gafni (1989). They propose
a procedure in which a health-duration pair is measured in “healthy-years equivalents” (HYEs)
by assessing an indifferent health-duration pair in which  HYE  years of optimal health are
followed by death. See also, e.g., Gafni et al. (1993), Loomes (1995), and Johannesson (1995).
Duration is an essential part of health outcomes modeled either as health states or as health-
duration pairs. Simply stated, the reason is that health occurs over time. In the case of health
states, duration is implicit. It might be constant—or at least independent of the health state and
the individual. Or it might be unknown. In the case of health-duration pairs, duration is explicit.
What is implicit is the person’s health afterward.
This section develops models to be applied when the health state in a health-duration pair is
followed by a state of death. Either the person dies at the end of the time period, or the health
state is a state of death and thus the person is dead from the initial time. We have this ‘death-
afterward’ situation in mind when we assume, for instance, that longer durations are preferable.
As before, assume that the sets Si  of health states are a common set S  and that a proper
quality scale q si( )  is defined on the set S . Also, assume that S  contains one or more states of
death and that these states are the least preferred health states. Similar models can be developed
in which any health state is better than death or in which there are health states worse than death.
For expected-utility models having states worse than death, see Miyamoto et al. (1998).
Suppose that q si( ) ≥ 0  for any health state si  and that q d( ) = 0  where d  denotes a specified
state of death. If the predetermined scale q si( )  does not have these properties, then it can be
replaced by the scale q si q d( ) ( )− . Thus, the range of the scale q si( )  is a non-point interval of
non-negative numbers that contains zero as its lower endpoint.
We assume that the set of durations is the interval T = ∞( , )0 . Thus, the set of health-duration
pairs is defined as the product set H S= × ∞( , )0 . This choice of  T  avoids two issues: that of
interpreting outcomes of zero duration, and that of assigning an upper bound on duration.
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This section discusses the linkage between q si( )  and an individual intensity relation  i . We
define conditions on q si( )  and  i  that imply special forms of an individual difference function,
and we discuss assessment procedures that use these forms. The resulting models are similar to
the expected-utility models referenced above.
Whereas ordinal preferences between health states depend only on the quality scale q si( ) ,
ordinal preferences between health-duration pairs also depend on the duration scale ti . For this
reason, the conditions on preferences in this section are somewhat more complicated than the
corresponding conditions in the previous section.
An individual intensity relation  i  will called scale-proper provided that it has a difference
function w s ti i( , )  such that for any health state  s
*  or duration  t *  the range of the function
w si t( , )
*  or w s ti( , )
*  is an interval and at least one of these ranges is non-point. We show in the
Appendix that if an individual intensity relation is scale-proper, then it is proper.
First, we define conditions on the ordinal preferences induced by an intensity relation  i .
(e1)  For any pairs ( , )s ti i , ( , )′s ti i  with a common duration ti : q s q si i( ) ( )> ′  if and only if
( , )s ti i  is preferred to ( , )′s ti i .
(e2)  For any pairs ( , )s ti i , ( , )s ti i′  with a common health state si : If q si( ) > 0 , then t ti i> ′  if and
only if ( , )si ti  is preferred to ( , )si ti′ . If q si( ) = 0 , then ( , )si ti  is indifferent to ( , )si ti′ .
(e3)  For any health state si  and any health-duration pair ( , )* *s ti i  with q si( )* > 0 , there exists a
duration ti  such that ( , )s ti i  is less preferred than ( , )
* *s ti i .
Condition (e1) implies that for a fixed duration ti , the quality scale q si( )  represents ordinal
preferences between health states. Thus, (e1) is a direct analogue of condition (c).
Condition (e2) implies that for a fixed heath state si , if si  is preferred to death then longer
durations are preferred, and if si  is indifferent to death then all durations are indifferent.
Ethical arguments that social preferences should satisfy (e1) but not (e2) or vice versa have
not been propounded. But arguments have been made for an ‘equal value of life’ principle that
society should not compare health-duration pairs with non-death health states; see, e.g., Harris
(1987) and Nord (2001). This principle appears to violate both (e1) and (e2). For reasons why
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social preferences among health outcomes should depend on degrees of health and duration, see,
e.g., Singer et al. (1995), Williams (1997), and Hasman and Østerdal (2004).
Roughly speaking, condition (e3) states that for any health state si  there is a sufficiently brief
duration ti  such that the outcome ( , )s ti i  is less preferred than the comparison outcome ( , )
* *s ti i .
Whereas we define T = ∞( , )0  and introduce condition (e3), Bleichrodt et al. (1997) and
Miyamoto et al. (1998) define T = ∞[ , )0  and introduce a ‘zero-condition’ which states that any
two outcomes ( , )si 0  and ( , )′si 0  are indifferent. This condition and the condition that ordinal
preferences are continuous on the set S × ∞[ , )0  implies condition (e3) on the subset S × ∞( , )0 .
Conditions (e1)-(e3) on ordinal preferences imply that an individual intensity relation  i  has
a difference function of the form, w s t g q s ti i i i( , ) ( ( ), )= , as described in the Appendix. The two-
variable function g q t( , )  has a general form and hence would be extremely difficult to assess.
Next, we introduce conditions on cardinal preferences which imply that g q t( , )  is a product
of two single-variable functions. This reduction can greatly simplify the assessment task.
(f1)  Preferences between two changes, ( , ) ( , )s t s ti i i i→ ′  and ( , ˆ ) ( , ˆ )s t s ti i i i→ ′ , with a common
health state si  are the same for any si  with q si( ) > 0 .
(f2)  Preferences between two changes, ( , ) ( , )s t s ti i i i→ ′  and ( ˆ , ) ( ˆ , )s t s ti i i i→ ′ , with a common
duration ti  are the same for any ti .
Theorem 6.  Suppose that q si( )  is a proper quality scale and that  i  is a scale-proper individual
intensity relation. Then, the following are equivalent: (i) q si( )  and  i  satisfy conditions (e1)-
(e3) and (f1); (ii) q si( )  and  i  satisfy conditions (e1)-(e3) and (f2); and (iii)  i  has an
individual difference function with the product form:
w s t D t f q si i i i( , ) ( ) ( ( ))= (4)
where f q( )  and D t( )  are continuous, strictly increasing functions such that f q d( ( )) = 0  and
lim ( )
t
D t→ =0 0 . Moreover, each of the functions D t( ) , f q( )  is unique up to a positive multiple.
The function f q( )  in (4) can be interpreted as a conversion function, and the function D t( )
in (4) can be interpreted as a cumulative discounting function, that is, D t d u dut( ) ( )= ∫0 where
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d u( )  is a discounting function. For preferences that are timing neutral (non-discounting), one
can choose d u( ) = 1 for u > 0  and thus D t t( ) =  for t > 0 .
Now, we define conditions that strengthen conditions (f1) and (f2) respectively.
(g1)  For any changes ( , ) ( , )s t s ti i i i→ ′  and ( , ˆ ) ( , ˆ )s t s ti i i i→ ′  with a common health state si , if
t t t ti i i i′ ′ −− = ˆ ˆ , then the changes are indifferent.
(g2)  For any changes ( , ) ( , )s t s ti i i i→ ′  and ( ˆ , ) ( ˆ , )s t s ti i i i→ ′  with a common duration ti , if
q s q s q s q si i i i( ) ( ) ( ˆ ˆ )′ ′ ) − (− = , then the changes are indifferent.
Condition (g1) requires that for a common health state society is indifferent between a
change in a short duration (thus in the near future) and the same change in a long duration (thus
in the distant future). There are ethical arguments in favor of such non-discounting, but most
people place far more importance on the near future than on the distant future; for example, they
would prefer an increase in a short duration to the same increase in a long duration.
Condition (g2) requires that for a common duration society is indifferent between a change
from a bad health state and a change from a good health state that has an equal difference in
quality scale amounts. This condition seems appropriate for many quality scales, and thus there
may be many situations in which (g2) but not (g1) is satisfied.
Theorem 7.  Suppose that q si( )  is a proper quality scale and that  i  is a scale-proper individual
intensity relation. Then:
(i) q si( )  and  i  satisfy conditions (e1)-(e3) and (g1) if and only if  i  has an individual
difference function that is linear in the variable ti , that is:
w si ti ti f q si( , ) ( ( ))= (5a)
where f q( )  is a continuous, strictly increasing function with f q d( ( )) = 0 .
(ii) q si( )  and  i  satisfy conditions (e1)-(e3) and (g2) if and only if  i  has an individual
difference function that is linear in the variable q si( ) , that is:
w si ti D ti q si( , ) ( ) ( )= (5b)
where D t( )  is a continuous, strictly increasing function with lim ( )
t
D t→ =0 0 .
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(iii)  q si( )  and  i  satisfy conditions (e1)-(e3) and (g1)-(g2) if and only if  i  has an individual
difference function of the form:
w si ti ti q si( , ) ( )= (5c)
Moreover, each of the functions f q( ) , D t( )  in (5a), (5b) is unique up to a positive multiple.
Expected-utility functions of the form (5a) represent risk neutrality toward future duration,
and expected-utility functions of the form (5b) represent risk neutrality toward quality scale
amounts. See, e.g., Pliskin et al. (1980) and Broome (1993) for discussions of such functions.
7.  QALY and YALQ Scales
A health-duration pair can be evaluated by selecting a ‘standard amount’ of si  or ti  and
finding an amount of the other such that the resulting health-duration pair is indifferent to
( , )si ti . The well-known method is to select a state s
* of optimal health as the standard health
state, and for a given health-duration pair ( , )s ti i  assess a duration  ˆt  such that  ( , ˆ )
*s t  is
indifferent to ( , )s ti i . As mentioned in Section 6,  ˆt  is called the ‘quality-adjusted life years’ for
the pair ( , )s ti i  and is denoted by QALY. If the health state si  in a pair ( , )s ti i  is less preferred
than s*,  then the quality-adjusted life years  ˆt  for the pair ( , )s ti i  will be less than ti .
The alternative method is to select a standard duration t*. Perhaps, t* is an extremely long
duration (what might be called a Methuselahn duration). For a given health-duration pair ( , )s ti i ,
assess a health state sˆ  such that ( ˆ, )*s t  is indifferent to ( , )s ti i . We will refer to the amount
ˆ ( ˆ)q q s=  as the years-adjusted life quality of the pair ( , )s ti i , and we will denote qˆ  by YALQ.
If the duration ti  in a pair ( , )s ti i  is less than t
*,  then the years-adjusted life quality qˆ  for the
pair ( , )s ti i  will be less than q si( ) .
The QALY scale is well-known, while the YALQ scale appears to be new. For technical
reasons, we will modify the above definitions so that each scale is a function of pairs ( ( ), )q s ti i
rather than a function of health-duration pairs ( , )s ti i . As shown in the Appendix, conditions
(e1)-(e3) imply that each scale represents ordinal preferences between health-duration pairs. 
Suppose that ˆ ( ( ), )t q s ti i= QALY  denotes a QALY scale and that ˆ ( ( ), )q q s ti i= YALQ
denotes a YALQ scale. A QALY scale is defined on pairs ( ( ), )q s ti i  such that 0 < ≤q s qi( ) *
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(where q q s* *( )= ) and ti > 0 , and a YALQ scale is defined on pairs ( ( ), )q s ti i  such that
0 < ≤t ti *  and q si( ) > 0 . The inequalities ti > 0  are not a restriction since zero durations have
been excluded while the inequalities q si( ) > 0  exclude health states that are indifferent to death.
In general, a QALY scale or a YALQ scale would be difficult to assess since it is a function
of two variables, namely q si( )  and ti . By choosing t ti = *  or q s qi( ) *= , the scales induce the
single-variable scales: Q q s q s ti i* *( ( )) ( ( ), )= QALY  and Y t q ti i* ( ) ( *, )= YALQ . As shown in
the Appendix, the functions Q q si* ( ( ))  and Y ti* ( )  are inverses of one another.
Theorem 8.  Suppose that a quality scale q si( )  and an individual intensity relation  i  satisfy
the assumptions in Theorem 6 and that a health-duration pair ( , )* *s t  with q q s* *( )= > 0  has
been specified. Then, there exists a unique individual difference function of the product form,
w s ti i* ( , ) = D t f q si i( ) ( ( )) , where f q( )  and D t( )  are continuous, strictly increasing functions
such that f q d( ( )) = 0 , f q s( ( ))* = 1 and lim ( )
t
D t→ =0 0 , D t( )* = 1. Moreover:
w s t D q s t f q s ti i i i i i* ( , ) ( ( ( ), ) ) ( ( ( ),= =QALY YALQ )) (6)
and
w s t D t D Q q s f q s f Y q si i i i i* * *( , ) ( ) ( ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( (= = i ) ) (7)
for any health-duration pair ( , )s ti i  with 0 < ≤q s qi( ) * and 0 < ≤t ti * .
Suppose that condition (g1) is satisfied, that is, society is neutral toward differences in
duration (non-discounting). Then, D t t t( ) / *= , and formulas (6), (7) imply that w s ti i* ( , ) =
QALY( ( ), ) ) ( ) ( ( ) )( )* * *q s t t t Q q s ti i i i
− −=1 2 . As another special case, suppose that condition
(g2) is satisfied, that is, society is neutral toward differences in quality scale amounts. Then,
f q q q( ) / *= , and thus w s t q s t q q s Y ti i i i i i* * *( , ) ( ( ), ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )= =
−YALQ 1 ( ) .*q −2  In particular,
a YALQ scale Y ti* ( )  is more appropriate than a QALY scale Q q si* ( ( ))  when: (i) Discounting
is used (rather than timing neutrality), and (ii) The quality scale is defined as or is converted to a
scale such that equal differences in quality scale amounts have the same social importance.
Imagine a situation in which neither of the conditions (g1), (g1) is satisfied. The product
form of a difference function w s ti i* ( , )  and the formulas (6), (7) suggest the following methods
for assessing w s ti i* ( , ) : (i) Assess a cumulative discounting function D t( )  and a conversion
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function f q( ),  (ii) Assess a cumulative discounting function D t( )  and a QALY scale
Q q si* ( ( )),  and (iii) Assess a conversion function f q( )  and a YALQ scale Y ti* ( ) .
The single-variable functions and scales can be assessed by equal-differences procedures,
person-tradeoffs procedures, or other types of procedures. This paper does not undertake a
comprehensive discussion of assessment procedures—either those that like the equal-differences
and person-tradeoffs procedures consist of direct assessments or those that like constant
discounting depend on assuming that the function or scale belongs to a parametric family.
8.  Evaluating Policy Options
This section discusses how a population difference function that has been constructed as part
of a public health study can be used to evaluate the policy options in the study. In contrast to
procedures to obtain a population difference function, these procedures use such a function. The
health outcomes can be of any type: e.g., health states, health-duration pairs, or health streams.
Since a population difference function is a cardinal scale, a change in public health can be
legitimately measured by a difference in function values. By contrast, an expected-utility
function or an ordinal scale cannot be used in this manner unless it is also a difference function.
Assume that each policy option in a public health study is predicted to produce a change
from one health distribution to another. The initial distribution may be, e.g., the predicted public
health for the current policy of intervention or for a policy of non-intervention, and the final
distribution may be, e.g., the predicted public health for the proposed policy option.
It would be more realistic to assume that each policy option leads to a probability distribution
of changes. However, this paper does not discuss such models nor does it discuss when the extra
realism of using probability distributions of changes rather than predicted changes is needed.
By the evaluation of a policy option, we mean the following process: (1) Calculate a change
in public health that is indifferent to the change produced by the policy option. The hypothetical
change may be simpler and more easily understood than the predicted change. (2) Report the
calculated change as an evaluation of the policy option.
Below, we discuss two methods for this process. Each method assumes that a public health
evaluation model (as described in Section 3) has been constructed. In particular, suppose that
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h = …( , , )h hN1  denotes a health distribution and that W a w h a w hN N N( ) ( ) ( )h = +…+1 1 1
denotes a population difference function.
Calculating a common change for everyone
In the first type of evaluation, a health outcome h( )0  has been specified and a health outcome
hˆ  is to be calculated. Suppose that h( )0  and hˆ  denote the health distributions in which everyone
experiences the health outcome h( )0  or hˆ  respectively.
For a policy option with a predicted change h h→ ′  in public health, calculate a health distri-
bution hˆ  such that W W( ˆ ) ( )( )h h− =0 W W( ) ( )h h′ − . Then, the change h h( ) ˆ0 →  is indifferent
to the change h h→ ′ , and in that sense it is equivalent to h h→ ′ . Hence, one can evaluate the
policy option as the hypothetical change h h( ) ˆ0 →  in health outcomes for everyone.
This method of evaluation will be especially simple in two situations. First, it may be
appropriate to choose the same initial distribution h( )0  to evaluate each of the policy options. In
this case, assume that the individual difference functions w hi i( )  have been partially normalized
such that w hi( )
( )0 0=  for i N= …1, , , and thus W ( )( )h 0 0= . Then, W W W( ˆ ) ( ) ( ˆ )( )h h h− =0 ,
and thus a policy option can be evaluated as a common hypothetical health outcome hˆ .
Second, an equal preferences model may be appropriate. In this case, suppose that the
common individual difference function is denoted by w h( )  and that the interpersonal weights
have been normalized so that they sum to unity. Then, W W( ˆ ) ( )( )h h− =0 w h w h( ˆ) ( )( )− 0 , and
thus a policy option can be evaluated as a difference ∆ = −w w h w h( ˆ) ( )( )0  in the cardinal scale
w h( ) . The difference ∆w  is independent of the health outcomes h( )0  and hˆ .
Suppose that the health outcomes in an equal preferences model are health states, h si i= .
Then, w h w h f q s f q s( ˆ) ( ) ( ( ˆ)) ( ( ))( ) ( )− = −0 0 . In the case that equal differences in health quality
are equally important (i.e., condition (d) is satisfied), and thus q si( )  is a cardinal scale, it follows
that w h w h( ˆ) ( )( )− =0 q s q s( ˆ) ( )( )− 0 . Then, a policy option can be evaluated as a difference
∆ = −q q s q s( ˆ) ( )( )0  in the quality scale q si( ) .
Next, suppose that the health outcomes in an equal preferences model are health-duration
pairs, h s ti i i= ( , ) . In this case, one may restrict the health-duration pair 
ˆ ( ˆ, ˆ)h s t=  to one of the
forms, ˆ ( , ˆ)( )h s t= 0  or ˆ ( ˆ, )( )h s t= 0 . In the first case, a policy option can be evaluated as a change
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from t( )0  to tˆ  in duration conditional on the health state s( )0 , and in the second case a policy
option can be evaluated as a change from s( )0  to sˆ  in health conditional on the duration t( )0 .
If the individual difference function w h( )  has a product form, then w s t w s t( ˆ, ˆ) ( , )( ) ( )− =0 0
D t f q s D t f q s(ˆ) ( ( ˆ)) ( ) ( ( ))( ) ( )− 0 0 . When timing neutrality is appropriate (i.e., condition (g1) is
satisfied), it follows that w s t w s t t t f q s( , ˆ) ( , ) ( ˆ ) ( ( ))( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0− = − . Then, one can evaluate
a policy option as a change ∆ = −t t tˆ ( )0  in duration conditional on the health state s( )0 . And
when equal differences in health quality are equally important (i.e., condition (g2) is satisfied), it
follows that w s t w s t D t f q s f q( ˆ, ) ( , ) ( ) ( ( ˆ) (( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (0 0 0 0− = − ( )( ) )s 0 . Then, one can evaluate a
policy option as a change ∆ = −q q s q s( ˆ) ( )( )0  in health quality conditional on the duration t( )0 .
Calculating a subpopulation with a specified change
Again, assume a public health evaluation model as described in Section 3. Assume that two
health outcomes h
*
, h*  have been specified, and suppose that h
*
 and h* denote the health
distributions in which everyone experiences the health outcome h
*
 or h*  respectively. For
n N= …0 1, , , , suppose that h( )n  denotes the health distribution in which the first n  members
of the population experience the health outcome h
*
 and the remaining N n−  members of the
population experience the health outcome h* . Then, in particular h h( )
*
0 =  and h h( ) *N = .
Consider a policy option with a predicted change h h→ ′  in public health. To focus the
discussion, assume that both the change h h→ ′  and the change  h h* *→  are improvements in
public health and that h h→ ′  is less preferred than  h h* *→ .
One method for evaluating such a policy option is to calculate a number n  between 0 and N
such that W Wn( ) ( )( )
*
h h−  is approximately equal to W W( ) ( )h h′ − . In effect, one is calculating
a subpopulation consisting of the first n  members of the population. Then, the change  h h*
( )→ n
is indifferent to the change h h→ ′ . Thus, one can evaluate the policy option as the hypothetical
change  h h*
*→  in health outcomes for the subpopulation defined as the first n  members of the
population. In an equal weights model, one can report either the number n  or the fraction  n N/
of population members with the hypothetical change  h h*
*→ .
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Appendix:  Proofs of Results
First, we establish the following result which strengthens the condition of ‘properness.’
Theorem A1.  If an intensity relation   is proper, i.e., it has a difference function w h( )  with a
non-point interval range I , then any difference function for   is a positive linear transformation
of w h( )  and has a non-point interval range.
Proof.  Suppose that a function z h( )  with a range J  is a difference function for  . Then, w h( )
and z h( )  are both ordinal scales for  , and thus z h f w h( ) ( ( ))=  for some strictly increasing
function f w( ) . The domain of f w( )  is the non-point interval I , and its range is the set J .
For w w< ′  in I , define w w w= ′+1 2 1 2/ / . There exist h h h, , ′  in H  such that w h w( ) = ,
w h w( ) = , and w h w( )′ = ′ . Thus, w w w w− = ′ −  implies that h h h h→ → ′∼  which implies
z h z h z h z h( ) ( ) ( ) ( )− − ′=  which implies f w f w f w( ) / ( ) / ( )= ′+1 2 1 2 . Jensen (1905, 1906)
proved that any continuous function that satisfies the above equation is linear (see, e.g., Aczél,
1966, p. 43), and essentially the same argument can be used to show that any increasing function
that satisfies the equation is linear. The further arguments are straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 1.  We will show that the health evaluation model in Section 3 is a corollary
of the social welfare (SW) model in Harvey (1999). The set C  of alternative consequences for n
individuals in the SW model corresponds to the set H HN1 ×…×  of health distributions for N
individuals in the health evaluation model, and the intensity relations  i  and   in the SW
model correspond to the intensity relations  i  and P  here.
We have made significant changes in the assumptions concerning each intensity relation. The
SW model assumes that the set C  mentioned above is topologically connected and that each of
the intensity relations  i  and   satisfies a set of conditions that implies that it has a continuous
difference function. It follows (as can be shown) that the range of any difference function is an
interval. As the primary part of the condition of ‘properness,’ we merely assume that there exists
a difference function with an interval range. This assumption provides a more general model
since it does not imply the assumptions mentioned above that are used in the SW model.
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The ‘properness’ condition does require, however, that the interval ranges mentioned above
are non-point (which is equivalent to the condition that not all changes are indifferent). In this
sense, the model here is a restriction of the SW model. Our motive for the requirement of a non-
point range is to exclude a situation that we believe to be unimportant and a distraction.
The health evaluation model assumes that an intensity relation  i  depends only on changes
in the i-th component of the set H HN1 ×…× , that is, it depends only on changes in health for
the i-th individual. This assumption implies condition (D) in the SW model which states (in our
terminology) that for any health distributions h( ) , , , ,i i N= …1  there is a health distribution h
such that h  is indifferent to h( )i  according to  i  for each i N= …1, , . The reason is that for the
given distributions h( )i  we can define a health distribution h = …( , , )( ) ( )h hN
N
1
1  where hi
i( )  is
the i-th component of h( )i . Then, for each i N= …1, ,  the distribution h  has the same i-th
component as the distribution h( )i , and thus it is indifferent to h( )i  according to  i .
As one can verify, the Pareto condition here is equivalent to the Pareto conditions (A), (B) in
the SW model. Theorem A1 implies that any individual difference function has an interval range.
Hence, the Pareto condition implies by the proof of the SW model that for any given individual
difference functions w hi i( ) , i N= …1, , , there exists a population difference function of the
weighted-sum form (1). Theorem A1 also implies that any individual difference function has a
non-point range, and it follows that the interpersonal weights must be positive. It is straight-
forward to verify that the weights are unique up to a positive multiple and to verify the converse
implication, namely that the weighted-sum form (1) implies the Pareto condition.
Proof of Corollary 1.  In an equal weights model, for any individual difference function w h( )
one can choose the interpersonal weights as any single positive number.
Proof of Theorem 2.  Suppose that w h( )  is a common individual difference function and that
W a w h a w hN N( ) ( ) ( )h = +…+1 1  is an associated population difference function.
First, assume condition (a). If two changes, h→ = ′( ; )h h hi  and h→ = ′( ; )h h hj , are
indifferent, then a w h a w h a w h a w hi i j j( ) ( ) ( ) ( )′ − = ′ −  by cancelling common terms. Since we
can choose h , ′h  such that w h w h( ) ( )≠ ′ , it follows that a ai j= .  Next, assume condition (b). If
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two health distributions ( , ; )h h h h hi j= ′ = ′′  and ( , ; )h h h h hi j= ′ = ′′  are indifferent, then
a w h a w h a w h a w hi ij j( ) ( ) ( ) ( )′ + = + ′  by cancelling common terms, and it follows that a ai j= .
One can verify that, conversely, if the weights are equal then the intensity relations I  and
P  satisfy conditions (a) and (b).
Proof of Corollary 2.  Apply Theorem 2 to each subpopulation.
Proof of Theorem 3.  For a given individual difference function w h( ) , Theorem 1 states that
there exist weights a aN1 , ,…  such that W a w h a w hN N( ) ( ) ( )h = +…+1 1  is a population
difference function, and Corollary 2 states that there exist weights ˆ , , ˆa ak1 …  such that ˆ ( )W h =
ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )a w h a w hii iiP k Pk1 1∈ +…+ ∈∑ ∑  is a population difference function. We can assume that
the weights are normalized such that a aN1 1+…+ =  and n a n ak k1 1 1ˆ ˆ+…+ = . Then, a ai = ˆ1
for i  in P1  and so forth. Hence, W a w h a w hi ii i iiP Pk( ) ( ) ( )h = ∈ +…+ ∈∑ ∑1 =
ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )a w h a w h Wii iiP k Pk1 1∈ +…+ ∈ =∑ ∑ h  for any health distribution h .
We wish to compare the population difference function W ( )h  with the function W ( )h =
1
1/ ( ) ( ) )(N Nw h w h+…+  where  W ( )h may or may not be a population difference function.
Suppose that h  is a health distribution which has equal scale averages as in (3), and denote the
common average by w . Then, W W n a w n a w wk k( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆh h= = +…+ =1 1 . Moreover,
W w hii w hii n wN P N P Nk
( ) / ( ) / ( ) / (h = ∈ +…+ ∈ = +∑ ∑1 1 1 11 …+ =n w wN ) , and thus
W W w( ) ( )h h= =  as was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem 4.  Since the quality scale q si( )  and the individual intensity relation  i  are
proper, q si( )  has a non-point interval range and  i  has an individual difference function w si( )
with a non-point interval range. Suppose that Iq  and Iw  denote the ranges of q si( )  and w si( ) .
The function w si( )  represents the ordinal relation  i
o
 induced by  i  as well as the intensity
relation  i  itself. It follows in particular that the ordinal relation  i
o
 is complete, i.e., for any
health states si  and ′si , either si  and ′si  are indifferent or one is preferred to the other.
For part (i), first assume condition (c). Then, for any health states si  and ′si , si  is preferred
to ′si  if and only if q s q si i( ) ( )> ′ . To show that q si( )  is an ordinal scale, it remains to show that
si  is indifferent to ′si  iff q s q si i( ) ( )= ′ . If si  is not indifferent to ′si , then by completeness either
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si  is preferred to ′si  or ′si  is preferred to si . In either case, it follows by (c) that q s q si i( ) ( )≠ ′ .
And if q s q si i( ) ( )≠ ′ , it follows by (c) that either si  is preferred to ′si  or ′si  is preferred to si .
Hence, both q si( )  and w si( )  are ordinal scales for  i
o
. By the uniqueness property of
ordinal scales, there is a strictly increasing function f q( )  defined on the interval Iq  such that
w si f q si( ) ( ( ) )=  for si  in S . The range of the function f q( )  is the range Iw  of the function
w si( ) . Since Iq  and Iw  are intervals, it follows that the function f q( )  is continuous.
For part (ii). First assume conditions (c) and (d). By part (i) there is a continuous, strictly
increasing function f q( )  such that w s f q si i( ) ( ( ) )=  is an individual difference function. First,
we show that the function f q( )  is a linear. For any q q< ′  in the interval Iq , there are health
states si , si′  and sˆi  in S  such that q si q( ) = , q s qi( )′ = ′ , and q si q q( ˆ ) / /= + ′1 2 1 2 . Then,
q s q s q s q si i i i( ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ( )′ − = − > 0  which implies by condition (d) that the changes, si si→ ˆ  and
sˆ si i→ ′ , are indifferent which implies that w si w si w si w si( ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ( )′ − = −  which implies that
f q s f s f q s f q si i i i( ( )) (( ˆ )) ( ( ˆ )) ( ( ))′ − = − . Hence, f q s f q s f q si i i( ( ˆ )) / ( )) / ( ))( (= +1 2 1 2 ′ , and
thus f q q f q f q( / / ) / ) / )( (1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2+ ′ = + ′ . Since the function f q( )  is continuous and strictly
increasing, this Jensen’s equation implies that f q aq b( ) = +  for some constants  a > 0  and b .
But an individual difference function is cardinally unique by Theorem A1, and thus q si( )  is an
individual difference function.
Proofs of the converse implications are straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 5.  By Theorem 4, there exists a conversion function f q( )  that is continuous,
strictly increasing, and whose domain Iq  is a non-point interval. By Theorem A1, an individual
difference function is cardinally unique, and thus any conversion function has these properties.
Consider any points q q< ′  and q q q= + ′1 2 1 2/ /  in Iq . There exist health distributions
s = …( , , )s s  and s = …( , , )s sN1  such that: q s q( ) = , q s q( )1 = , q s q( )2 = ′ , and q si q( ) =
for  i > 2 . Hence, s  has unequal health scale amounts, and 1 1/ ( ) ( ) ( )( )N q s q s q s qN+…+ = = .
If s  is indifferent to s , then N f q s f q s f q sN× = +…+( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))1  which implies that
f q f q f q( ) / ( ) / ( )= + ′1 2 1 2 . Since q q< ′  are any points in Iq  and the function f q( )  is contin-
uous, this Jensen’s equation implies that f q( )  is linear on Iq . It is also strictly increasing, and
thus by cardinal uniqueness the quality scale q si( )  is an individual difference function.
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If s  is preferred to s , then N f q s f q s f q sN× > +…+( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))1  which implies that
f q f q f q( ) / ( ) / ( )> + ′1 2 1 2 . Since q q< ′  are any points in the interval Iq  and the function
f q( )  is continuous, it follows that f q( )  is strictly concave on Iq .
Proofs of the converse implications are straightforward.
Theorem A2.  If an individual intensity relation 
 
 i  is scale-proper, then it is proper.
Proof.  Suppose that w s ti i( , )  is a scale-proper difference function for  
 i  and that w
( )1
, w( )2
are two amounts in the range of w s ti i( , ) . Then, there exists health-duration pairs ( , )
( ) ( )s t1 1 ,
( , )( ) ( )s t2 2  such that w s t w( , )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1=  and w s t w( , )( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2= . Define s s* ( ),= 1  t t* ( ),= 2  and
w w s t* * *( , )= . The interval range I  of the function w s ti( , )
*
 contains  w *  and w( )2 , and the
interval range J  of the function w s ti( , )*  contains w
( )1
 and  w * . Thus, the union of I  and J  is
an interval, and it contains w( )1  and w( )2 . Hence, any amount between w( )1  and w( )2  is in the
range of the function w s ti i( , ) . It follows that the range of w s ti i( , )  is an interval. It is non-point
since for some range of w s ti i( , )  restricted to a single variable is non-point.
Theorem A3.  Suppose that q si( )  is a proper quality scale and that  
 i  is a scale-proper
individual intensity relation. Then, q si( )  and  
 i  satisfy conditions (e1)-(e3) if and only if  
 i
has a continuous difference function of the form w s t g q s ti i i i( , ) ( ( ), )=  such that:
(i) For any duration t , g q t( , )  is a strictly increasing function of q .
(ii) For any health quality  q > 0 , g q t( , )  is a strictly increasing function of t .
(iii) g t( , )0 0=  for any duration t , and lim ( , )
t
g q t→ =0 0  for any health quality q .
In this case, the ordinal relation  i
o  defined on health-duration pairs ( , )s ti i  induces an
ordinal relation qo  defined on pairs ( , )q t , and the function g q t( , )  is an ordinal scale for qo .
Proof.  The properness assumptions imply that the range Q  of q si( )  is a non-point interval and
that 
 
 i  has a difference function w si ti( , ) . The function w si ti( , )  also represents the ordinal
relation  i
o
 defined by 
 
 i . and thus  i
o
 is complete.
Assume conditions (e1)-(e3). Since  i
o
 is complete, condition (e1) implies that for any si ,
′si , and ti :  q s q si i( ) ( )= ′  iff ( , )s ti i  is indifferent to ( , )′s ti i . But, ( , )s ti i  is indifferent to ( , )′s ti i
iff w si ti w si ti( , ) ( , )= ′ . Therefore, w si ti( , ) = g q s ti i( ( ), )  where g q t( , )  is a function of quality
scale amounts q q si= ( )  in the interval Q  and durations t ti=  in the interval  T .
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Condition (e1) implies that for any t *  in T , the function g q t( , )*  is strictly increasing.
Condition (e2) implies that for any q* > 0  in Q , the function g q t( , )*  is strictly increasing and
that for q* = 0  the function g t( , )0  is constant. Since the domains and ranges of these functions
are intervals, it follows that they are continuous. Since they are strictly increasing or constant, it
then follows the function g q t( , )  is continuous.
Since the difference function w si ti( , )  is cardinally unique, we can subtract the constant
g t( , )0  from it and from g q t( , )  to obtain functions, which we also denote by w si ti( , )  and
g q t( , )  such that g t( , )0 0=  for t  in the interval T .
To show that lim ( , )
t
g q t→ =0 0  for any health quality q , it suffices to show that for any ε > 0 ,
there exists a duration t  such that g q t( , ) < ε . Since g t( , )0 0=  for any t , there is nothing to
show when  q = 0 . Consider  q > 0  and ε > 0 . First, choose t* = 1 . Since the function g q( , )1  is
continuous and strictly increasing, there is a  q* > 0  such that g q( , )* 1 < ε . Choose an s *  with
q s q( * *) =  and an si  with q s qi( ) = . Condition (e4) implies that there is a duration t  such that
w s t w si( , ) ( *, )< 1 . Hence, g q t g q( , ) ( , )*< <1 ε .
The converse implications are straightforward. Moreover, the ordinal relation  i
o  on pairs
( , )s ti i  induces an ordinal relation qo  on pairs ( , )q t  since for any fixed duration t ti=  the
quality scale q si( )  is an ordinal scale for  i
o . And the function g q t( , )  is an ordinal scale for
qo  since the function g q s ti i( ( ), )  is an ordinal scale for  i
o .
Proof of Theorem 6.  Assume conditions (e1)-(e3) and (f2). Then, there exists a function
w s t g q s ti i i i( , ) ( ( ), )=  as described in Theorem A3. The intensity relation  
 i  on pairs ( , )s ti i
induces an intensity relation 
 
g  on the pairs ( , )q t , and g q t( , )  is a difference function for  
g .
Condition (f1) implies that for any amount  q > 0 , the relation  g  induces the same intensity
relation on changes in duration. Each function g q t( , )  with fixed  q > 0  is a difference function
with an interval range for this common intensity relation. Select an amount q* > 0 . Cardinal
uniqueness implies that g q t a q g q t b q( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )*= +  for any  q > 0  where a q( ) > 0 . Thus, a q( )
and b q( )  are functions of  q > 0 . But, lim ( , )t g q t→ =0 0  for any amount q , and thus b q( ) = 0  for
 q > 0 . Hence, g q t a q g q t( , ) ( ) ( , )*=  for  q > 0 . Define a( )0 0= . Then, g q t a q g q t( , ) ( ) ( , )*=
for any amount q . Theorem A3 implies that the function f q( )  defined as a q( )  and the function
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D t g q t( ) ( , )*=  are continuous and strictly increasing with f ( )0 0=  and lim
t→0 D t( ) = 0 . Hence,
the difference function w s t D t f q si i i i( , ) ( ) ( ( ))=  has the product form as described.
Conditions (e1)-(e3) and (f2) imply the form (4) as described by similar arguments, and it is
straightforward to verify the converse implications.
If w s t D t f q si i i i( , ) ( ) ( ( ))=  and ˆ ( , ) ˆ ( ) ˆ( ( ))w s t D t f q si i i i=  are two difference functions as
described, then wˆ a w b= +  for some constants a > 0  and b. But b = 0  since f f( ) ˆ( )0 0 0= = .
Hence, ˆ ( ) ˆ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))D t f q s a D t f q si i i i=  where a > 0 . It is straightforward to show that this
implies that ˆ ( ) ( )D t a D ti i= 1  and ˆ( ( )) ( ( ))f q s a f q si i= 2  for some constants a a1 2 0, > .
Proof of Theorem 7.  For part (i), assume conditions (e1)-(e3) and (g1). For any durations t t< ′ ,
define ˆ / /t t t= + ′1 2 1 2 . Condition (g1) implies that g q t g q t g q t g q t( , ) ( , ˆ) ( , ˆ) ( , )′ − = −  for any
amount q . Hence, g q t t( , / / )1 2 1 2+ ′ = 1 2 1 2/ ( , ) / ( , )g q t g q t+ ′ . For a fixed q , g q t( , )  is a
strictly increasing or constant function, and thus this Jensen’s equation implies that
g q t a q t b q( , ) ( ) ( )= +  where a q( ) > 0  for  q > 0 . By the same arguments as in the previous
theorem, it follows that the difference function w s t g q s ti i i i( , ) ( ( ), )=  is as described in (5a).
The remaining arguments are omitted. The reason is that the proof of the forward implications
in (ii) and (iii) are similar to the above argument and the proof of the converse implications and of
the uniqueness statement are straightforward verifications.
Theorem A4.  Suppose that a quality scale q si( )  and an individual intensity relation  i  satisfy
the assumptions in Theorem A3 and that a pair ( , )* *q t  with q* > 0  has been specified. Then
(using the notation in Theorem A3):
(i)  For any pair ( ( ), )q s ti i  with 0 < ≤q si q( ) *  there exists a unique amount  ˆt  such that
( , ˆ )*q t  is indifferent to ( ( ), )q s ti i . Moreover, 0 < ≤ˆt ti . The scale ˆ ( ( ), )t q s ti i= QALY  defined
in this manner is a continuous ordinal scale for pairs ( ( ), )q s ti i  with 0 < ≤q s qi( ) * .
(ii)  For any pair ( ( ), )q s ti i  with 0 < ≤tˆ ti  there exists a unique amount qˆ  such that ( ˆ, )*q t  is
indifferent to ( ( ), )q s ti i . Moreover, 0 < ≤ˆ ( )q q si . The scale ˆ ( ( ), )q q s ti i= YALQ  defined in this
manner is a continuous ordinal scale for pairs ( ( ), )q s ti i  with 0 < ≤tˆ ti .
(iii)  The single-variable functions Q q q t* ( ) ( , )*= QALY  and Y t q t* ( ) ( *, )= YALQ  defined
on 0 < ≤q q *  and 0 < ≤t t*  are inverses of one another.
34
Proof.  The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) are similar, and thus we omit the proof of (ii).
To show part (i), suppose that g q s ti i( ( ), )  is an ordinal scale as described in Theorem A3,
and define g t g q t
*
*( ) ( , )= . Then, g t
*
( )  is a continuous and strictly increasing function whose
domain is the interval T = ∞( , )0  and whose range is a non-point interval of the form ( , ]0 b  or
( , )0 b  where the upper endpoint b  in ( , )0 b  may be infinite.
Consider a pair ( ( ), )q s ti i  with 0 < ≤q s qi( ) * . Then, 0 < ≤ =g q s t g q t g ti i i i( ( ), ) ( , ) ( )* * .
Hence, there exists a unique tˆ  such that g t g q s ti i*(
ˆ) ( ( ), )= , and thus ( , ˆ)*q t  is indifferent to
( ( ), )q s ti i . Moreover, 0 < ≤ˆ *t t . The function w g t= *( )  has a continuous, strictly increasing
inverse function g w
*
( )−1 , and thus ˆ ( ( ( ), ) )
*
t g g q s ti i=
−1
.
Define QALY( ( ), )q s ti i  as  ˆt  for 0 < ≤q s qi( ) * . Then, QALY( ( ), ) ( ( ( ), ) )*q s t g g q s ti i i i= −1 .
Since g q s ti i( ( ), )  is an ordinal scale and the function g w* ( )
−1
 is strictly increasing, it follows
that QALY( ( ), )q s ti i  is an ordinal scale. And the function QALY( ( ), )q s ti i  is continuous since
the functions g q s ti i( ( ), )  and  g w* ( )
−1
 are continuous.
For part (iii), suppose that t Q q q t= =* ( ) ( , )*QALY  where 0 < ≤q q *  and thus 0 < ≤t t* .
Then, ( , )*q t  is indifferent to ( , )*q t , and thus Y t q t q* ( ) ( *, )= =YALQ . In a similar manner,
q Y t q t= =* ( ) ( *, )YALQ  implies that t Q q q t= =* ( ) ( , )*QALY . Hence the functions Q q* ( )
and Y t* ( )  are inverses of one another.
Proof of Theorem 8.  Consider a pair ( ( ), )q s ti i  with 0 < ≤q s qi( ) *  and 0 < ≤t ti * . Then, there
exist unique amounts qˆ  and  ˆt  such that the pairs ( ˆ, )*q t , ( ( ), )q s ti i , and ( , )*q t  are indifferent.
Moreover, 0 < ≤ˆ ( )q q si , 0 < ≤tˆ ti  and ˆ ( ( ), )t q s ti i= QALY , ˆ ( ( ), )q q s ti i= YALQ . By Theorem
A3, the individual difference function w s ti i* ( , )  can be written as w s t g q s ti i i i* *( , ) ( ( ), )= .
Consider formula (6). The normalization f q( )* = 1 implies that w s t g q ti i* * *( , ) ( , ˆ )= =
D t f q D q s ti i( ˆ ) ( ) ( ( ( ), ) )* = QALY , and the normalization D t( )* = 1 implies that w s ti i* ( , ) =
g q t D t f q f q s ti i* * *( ˆ, ) ( ) ( ˆ ) ( ( ( ), ) )= = YALQ .
Next, consider formula (7). The definition Q q s q s ti i* ( ( )) ( ( ), )*= QALY  implies that the
pairs ( ( ), )*q s ti  and ( , * ( ( )) )*q Q q si  are indifferent. Hence, g q s t g q Q q si i* * * *( ( ), ) ( , * ( ( )) )= ,
and thus D t f q s D Q q s f qi i( ) ( ( ) ) ( * ( ( )) ) ( )* *=  which implies that f q s D Q q si i( ( ) ) ( * ( ( )) )= .
Hence, w s t D t f q s D t D Q q si i i i i i* ( , ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( * ( ( )) )= = . The proof that w s ti i* ( , ) =
f q s f Y q si i( ( )) ( ( ( ) )*  is similar.
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